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Article
A family living with
Alzheimer’s disease:
The communicative
challenges
Danielle Jones
School of Health Studies, University of Bradford, UK
Abstract
Alzheimer’s disease irrevocably challenges a person’s capacity to communicate with others. Earlier
research on these challenges focused on the language disorders associated with the condition and
situated language deficit solely in the limitations of a person’s cognitive and semantic impairments.
This research falls short of gaining insight into the actual interactional experiences of a person
with Alzheimer’s and their family. Drawing on a UK data set of 70 telephone calls recorded over a
two-and-a-half year period (2006–2008) between one elderly woman affected by Alzheimer’s
disease, and her daughter and son-in-law, this paper explores the role which communication
(and its degeneration) plays in family relationships. Investigating these interactions, using a
conversation analytic approach, reveals that there are clearly communicative difficulties, but
closer inspection suggests that they arise due to the contingencies that are generated by the
other’s contributions in the interaction. That being so, this paper marks a departure from
the traditional focus on language level analysis and the assumption that deficits are intrinsic to
the individual with Alzheimer’s, and instead focuses on the collaborative communicative
challenges that arise in the interaction itself and which have a profound impact on people’s
lives and relationships.
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Introduction
Alzheimer’s disease gradually and irrevocably challenges a person’s capacity to
communicate with others. Earlier research on these challenges focused on the language
disorders associated with the condition, and examined language formation and function
impairments. Naming disorders, verbal disfluency, anomia and perservation errors, as well
Corresponding author:
Danielle Jones, School of Health Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford BD7 1DP, UK.
Email: deekjones21@yahoo.co.uk
Dementia
0(0) 1–18
! The Author(s) 2013
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1471301213502213
dem.sagepub.com
XML Template (2013) [16.8.2013–3:42pm] [1–19]
//blrnas3/cenpro/ApplicationFiles/Journals/SAGE/3B2/DEMJ/Vol00000/130140/APPFile/SG-DEMJ130140.3d (DEM) [PREPRIN-
TER stage]
as other semantic impairments were found to be the kind of language deficits symptomatic of
Alzheimer’s (Bayles & Tomoeda, 1983; Binetti, 1995; Lawson & Barker, 1968). These clinical
investigations relied on such methodological techniques as cognitive batteries (Appell,
Kertesz, & Fisman, 1982; Bayles, 2003; Blair, Marczinski, Davis-Faroque, & Kertesz,
2007; Fromm & Holland, 1989), picture vocabulary tests (Bayles, 1985; Hier,
Hagenlocker, & Shindler, 1985; Shuttleworth & Huber, 1988) and similarity tests
(a subset of Wechsler’s Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) – see Wechsler, 1981; Martin &
Fedio, 1983). Despite the congruence between their clinical findings, the methodological
validity of such studies has been questioned (Bayles, 2003; Huﬀ, Cokin, & Growden,
1986; Nebes, 1985). Nebes (1985) suggests that language deficits arise from episodic
memory failings such as memory or contextual knowledge impairment rather than
semantic problems, and suggests that the poor results from tests administered in clinical
settings reflect the demands on the person with dementia in these situations. Furthermore,
Sabat (1991a) advises that from a profile of tests scores, it would be virtually impossible to
infer anything about a person with Alzheimer’s communicative and conversational abilities.
Sabat proposes that what is being investigated through these methods is how the disease
aﬀects a series of ‘functions’ as opposed to how it aﬀects persons living in the world.
More recent research has investigated the language used by people with Alzheimer’s in
their discourse in interviews (Aggarwal et al., 2003; Garwick, Detzner, & Boss, 1994;
Ripich & Terrell, 1988), narratives (Garcia & Joanette, 1997) and conversations (Mentis,
Briggs-Whittaker, & Gramigna, 1995; Orange, Lubinski, & Higginbotham, 1996; Small &
Perry, 2005; Spilkin & Bethlehem, 2003; Watson, Chenery, & Carter, 1999). These studies
tend to show a range of more pragmatic deficits such as inappropriate topic shifts,
abnormalities in appropriate word selection and taking more speaker turns compared
with conversations with normal elderly subjects (Campbell-Taylor, 1984; Hutchinson &
Jensen, 1980; Ripich & Terrell, 1988). These studies rely on data generated during topic
directed interviews or exchanges in artificial clinical situations (Campbell-Taylor, 1984;
Ripich & Terrell, 1988). Methods relying on clinical testing and artificial discourse
situations treat the language disabilities of the person with dementia in isolation from
the social context in which everyday interaction normally takes place, locating deficits
solely in their domain. The language problems associated with Alzheimer’s have been
commonly perceived as a property of the individual, arising from their cognitive
dysfunction. It is diﬃcult to extrapolate from research in such artificial situations to the
diﬃculties that a person with Alzheimer’s may experience in their natural everyday
interactions. Also the deficit-and-patient-focused approach meant that little attention
was paid to the other participant and their role in the interaction. Ripich, Vertes,
Whitehouse, Fulton, and Ekelman (1991, p.332) reported that, ‘although the literature
reveals little information regarding discourse of Alzheimer’s patients, even less is
reported about the discourse of their partners. Knowledge of partner’s discourse
features is crucial since communication is reciprocal with each participant shaping the
interaction’. Along with this focus on interaction, there was increasingly a shift in
perspective, away from communicative disorder as solely situated in the limitations of a
person’s communicative impairments, towards a wider focus on communication as a joint,
collaborative achievement. It is fundamental to perceive any impairment in communicative
functioning or general patterns and features of interaction as contextually situated and
collaboratively produced (Hamilton, 1994; Jones, 2012; Perkins, Whitworth, & Lesser,
1998; Sabat, 1991b).
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There is a greater concern in conversation analytic (CA) research to address the notion of
communicative ability as a contingent and emergent phenomenon in the field of dementia
research (Guendouzi & Muller, 2006; Hamilton, 1994; Mikesell, 2009, 2010; Perkins et al.,
1998; Wilson, Muller, & Damico, 2007). There is already an established body of CA research
in the field of cognitive impairment, such as autism (Local & Wootton, 1995; Stribling, Rae,
& Dickerson, 2009) and traumatic brain injury (Body, 2007; Body & Parker, 2005) as well as
language impairments such as aphasia (Goodwin, 2003; Goodwin, Goodwin, & Olsher,
2002; Wilkinson, 1999; Wilkinson, Beeke, & Maxim, 2010) and intellectual disabilities
(Williams, 2011), in studies of the sequential nature of collaborative and naturally
occurring interaction. However, the CA literature on interaction and Alzheimer’s is still
very young, with a focus on other dementias, for example frontotemporal dementia
(Mates, Mikesell, & Smith, 2010; Mikesell, 2009), as well as Alzheimer’s disease
(Hamilton, 1994; Jones, 2006; Wilson et al., 2007). Rather than studying single utterances
and isolated language products, CA researchers focus on ‘uncovering the socially organized
features of talk in context, with a major focus on actions sequences’ (Heritage & Atkinson,
1984, p.5). Some of the focal points of CA investigations have been repair (Watson et al.,
1999), laughter (Wilson et al., 2007) and questions (Hamilton, 1994; Jones, 2006; Mikesell,
2009). These studies, and indeed my own research (Jones, 2012) has found that, in the
presence of a progressive cognitive deficit, persons with dementia often retain the social
proficiency that permits them to contribute to conversation as a social action in
meaningful and contextually appropriate ways and are competent and cooperative
conversationalists (Hamilton, 1994; Jones, 2012; Muller & Wilson, 2008; Sabat, 1991b).
One of the fundamental challenges for communication previously unexplored in this
literature lies not in the semantic domain or with certain practices of talk, for example
whether a person with Alzheimer’s can perform a repair operation or if they can
accurately respond to or ask questions, but instead lies at the heart of one of the most
detrimental consequences of the disease: episodic memory impairment. Memory loss is
one of the most prominent and distressing cognitive disturbances associated with
Alzheimer’s disease. Episodic memory impairments can often impede an individual’s
ability to retrieve a previous experience and hinder the knowledge they can retain about
the world generally, and indeed about themselves and their lives. As the disease progresses, a
person’s ability to identify themselves, what they are doing and who the people are around
them decreases (Kennard, 2009). Often one’s memory regresses to a stage where an
individual believes they are living in the past. As a corollary of these memory
impairments there often appears to be misalignment between participants in interaction.
The person with dementia may be trying to interpret a world that no longer makes sense
to them whilst those around them often do not understand or account for this in their
communication. The co-participant in any given conversation will often use ‘ordinary’
interactional practices that are straightforward in their everyday interaction, but that are
inapposite when conversing with someone with memory impairments. This misalignment of
intersubjectivity, or shared understandings between interlocutors, has profound implications
for interaction and lies at the heart of the communicative challenges faced by people with
Alzheimer’s disease and their family. Investigating these interactions reveals that there are
clearly communicative diﬃculties, but closer inspection suggests that they arise due to the
contingencies generated by the other’s contributions in the interaction. That being so, this
paper marks a departure from the traditional focus on language level analysis and the
assumption that deficits are intrinsic to the individual with Alzheimer’s. Instead it focuses
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on the collaborative communicative challenges that arise in ordinary interactions in which
people with Alzheimer’s take part – challenges that have a profound impact on people’s lives
and relationships.
Data and methods
The data were collected as part of the author’s PhD research and consist of audio recordings
of 70 naturally occurring telephone conversations between a woman with Alzheimer’s
(pseudonymised as ‘May’) and her family members (daughter ‘Natalie’ and son-in-law
‘Bill’), recorded between February 2006 and June 2008. The recorded conversations range
from 23 s to 8min and 30 s (average duration 1.68min). A recording device was attached to
the family’s telephone. The device was manually operated, recording May’s calls only. The
family inspected the calls before giving them to the researcher for analysis to ensure they
could delete any recordings they did not want to feature in the research. In 2006, when
recording began, May was 72 years old and had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s 5 years
previously. May was resident at ‘Lilly Hill’, a residential home for the elderly; towards the
end of the study she moved to ‘Searle Court’, a specialist care home for people living with
dementia. During the period of study May displayed symptoms associated with moderate
stage Alzheimer’s, including confusion over her surroundings, needing substantial support in
daily living (for example dressing/cooking), being forgetful and anxious. Towards the end of
the study, May was reaching the stage of severe cognitive decline, although retaining a good
standard of semantic functioning. The most noticeable change was the degeneration of her
episodic memory.
Ethical permission for the study was sought as part of the researcher’s PhD proposal and
the ethics panel at the researcher’s University approved the proposal before research was
conducted. The significance of thorough ethical considerations is particularly pertinent in
research involving vulnerable adults. The BSA (sections 16 and 29) code states, ‘‘As far as
possible participation in sociological research should be based on the freely given informed
consent of those studied’’. Furthermore, ‘‘Special care should be taken where research
participants are particularly vulnerable by virtue of factors such as age, disability, their
physical or mental health . . .where there are particular diﬃculties in eliciting fully
informed consent. In some situations proxies may need to be used in order to gather
data. Where proxies are used, care should be taken not to intrude on the personal space
of the person to whom the data ultimately refer, or to disturb the relationship between this
person and the proxy’’. In accordance with these regulations, and after consideration of the
ethical complexities, informed consent was obtained from all the participants prior to
collecting the data: consent was given on behalf of the person with Alzheimer’s by her
daughter. It was deemed (by her daughter, working in May’s best interest) reasonably
practicable not to consult May directly about her participation in the research. As a
researcher, I was mindful not to impose a burden on the participants or cause ill eﬀect.
This research presents a dilemma caused by the conflict between research involving
participants who are incapable of giving informed consent, weighted against the benefits
of that research for informing dementia care. The interests of the participants were always
considered above those of the study. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 provided continued
guidance for the research.
The recordings were transcribed in considerable detail, to capture particular aspects of the
timing of speech (e.g. overlapping speech, pauses within and between speakers’ turns), and
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how things are said (including certain international features, emphasis, stretching of
sounds and words), using the transcriptions conventions widely adopted in CA (Jeﬀerson,
1983, 2004; for transcription conventions see Appendix 1). In transcribing the data, all
names of people, places and other potentially identifying information have been
pseudonymised. Recordings of real-life interactions are used because people’s recall is
often incomplete or faulty and repeated viewing of conversations enables us to capture
and investigate micro-details (e.g. silences, pitch, emphasis, self-repairs) that go beyond
anyone’s ability to recall.
CA was used as a method for analysing the data (for a summary see Drew, 2005; Sidnell,
2010). CA aims to explicate the practices through which interactants accomplish social
actions and understand one another’s conduct in conversation. CA is concerned with the
analysis of talk-in-interaction, which is a highly organised and orderly turn-taking system, in
which interactants design their talk within a sequential context to fulfill certain tasks. Turn
design is a fundamental property of all interactions and ‘refers to how a speaker constructs a
turn-at-talk’ (Drew, 2013, p.132). Our talk is designed with respect to certain contingencies,
to where in a sequence of talk a turn is being taken, to what is being done in that turn (i.e.
what action we are trying to accomplish) and to whom the turn is addressed. Thus, a turn at
talk is contingent on the other in interaction – their conduct, knowledge and competence.
Taking into consideration what you take your recipient to know, or progressively not
know – recipient design, lies at the very heart of turn design (Drew, 2013; Goodwin,
1979) and has implications on how interaction progresses. This study addresses the notion
of the appropriateness of a turn’s design relative to who is being addressed and more
specifically examines how turn design can have significant influence on achieving good
communication between a woman with Alzheimer’s and her family members.
The paper will present only a small number of extracts, comprising only short
communicative exchanges, but they exemplify larger patterns in the data (not statistically
presented here). Where appropriate, data extracts from ordinary interaction (widely used in
the CA community – extracts 1 and 4) will be used to oﬀer a comparison to the patterns of
interaction found between May and her family. This is a practice routinely used in CA
research to provide evidence for the findings.
Analysis
You rang?
Questions are omnirelevant in ordinary interaction. A key feature is that they generally rely
on or presuppose a recipient’s memory. Questions do not need to be grammatically
interrogative – they can be declaratively formed, e.g. ‘You Rang?’, nonetheless they imply
an imbalance of knowledge between speakers. Questions are designed to address this
imbalance (see Heritage & Roth, 1995; Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011). Before
illustrating these points with data from May’s interactions, I demonstrate briefly how
episodic memory can successfully be presupposed in the design of speakers’ turns during
‘ordinary’ interaction. In the following extract a daughter (‘Jess’) returns a missed call from
her father (‘Bill’). There are a specific range of contingences associated with the initiation of
business in call-backs which are often managed by the introduction of a particular
interactional resource – ‘‘you rang’’ (or its variants).1 Asking a co-participant if they had
previously called requires the recipient not only to remember whether they did indeed call,
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but also what they called about, and to initiate this business. In extract one, these
interactional tasks run oﬀ smoothly.
Extract 1
DJ: JB03
01 BIL: Hello:,
02 (0.2)
03 JES: Hi:::, Did you ri:ng me¿
04 (0.6)
05 BIL: Yea::h. Just picked up on that ne:w:s.
Jess reasonably and successfully presupposes Bill’s memory of previously calling her when
designing her turn ‘Did you ring me’. It is reasonable and successful as Bill continues to
confirm that he did call and proceeds to the business. Although not an explicit topic initiator
(as the topic is not directly stated but only referred to as ‘news’), this orients to establishing a
topic which is ‘known-in-common’ and newsworthy and which has previously been alluded
to or talked about. This exchange relies on both parties having intact episodic memory.
Employing such resources, which requires both the recollection and explication of some
prior event, is a potentially problematic practice in talk-in-interaction when a person’s
episodic memory is failing. Compare this with May’s management of the same
interactional task.
Extract 2
ALZ45
01 MAY: Hello:,
02 NAT: Hello:,
03 (0.3)
04 NAT: You tried to ring me I think a minute ago:.
05 (0.6)
06 MAY: Did I:,
07 (0.6)
08 MAY: Oh honestly. I’m sorry Natalie.
09 (0.4)
10 NAT: >Well it doesn’t matter,<
11 (0.4)
12 NAT: Do you know what you wanted. "No,
13 (0.8)
In part, the troubles May and her family experience at the start of many of their
conversations result from May’s inability to operate the care home’s payphone. The
payphone operates by the user dialing the number, listening for a connection, and then,
when a recipient answers, inserting the coins. As the large number of failed attempts and
call-backs on tape bear witness, May found this process challenging and often either did not
have the correct money to connect the call or could not insert the coins before the connection
failed.2 May’s family would then call her back, usually within seconds of her initial attempt.
Due to the proximate nature of these calls, one might expect May to remember that she just
tried calling her family and what it was she called about. Indeed by using the declarative
version of ‘‘did you ring me’’ (in extract 1 in it is interrogative form) – ‘‘you tried to ring me I
think a minute ago’’ (line 4) her family is displaying this expectation in the interaction itself
(albeit slightly mitigated with the inclusion of ‘‘I think’’). Despite the proximate occurrence
6 Dementia 0(0)
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of these returned calls in relation to the initial attempt, and due to the severity of her
cognitive deficits, May often displays no recollection of a call taking place, or indeed
what it was she wanted – here she asks, ‘‘did I’’. May and her daughter come to
experience diﬃculty in the interaction when Natalie presupposes May’s episodic memory
in the design of her turn but May is not able to recall that particular memory when
responding. Natalie does not take into consideration what her recipient progressively does
not know when designing her turn at talk that subsequently generates troubles in the
unfolding interaction.
Despite such troubles that are collaboratively generated in the interaction, May is often
able to show herself to be as a competent conversationalist by demonstrating that she
understands the requirements of the interaction but, due to her cognitive deficit, is not
able to meet the demands of that particular communicative resource which is initiated by
the other.
Extract 3
ALZ08
01 ((Dialling))
02 ((Ring, Ring-Ring))
03 (2.2)
04 ((Clunking sound))
05 MAY: Hello::,
06 NAT: Hello.¼You ra:ng. hh[h]
07 MAY: [O]h sorry love. Ye:s.
08 (1.2)
09 MAY: Am I coming tomorro:w.
May routinely manages these diﬃcult interactional moments by reverting to her ‘default’
reason for calling – her return home (business that she initiates in various ways in 42 of the
70 calls). Whether this enquiry – ‘‘Am I coming tomorrow’’ (line 09) is initiated in the
absence of her recollecting another topic (the topic that she ‘actually’ wanted to discuss)
or whether this was her original business is somewhat uncertain here. However, she displays
some troubles with remembering. Although she does produce the required confirmation –
‘Yes’ (line 7), which is aided by the certainty encompassed in the declarative construction of
‘‘you rang’’, there is nevertheless a lengthy gap before the production of this default business,
which is indicative of troubles. Furthermore the turn-initial ‘oh’ preface to the apology is
indicative of some problem with Natalie’s prior and marks May’s acknowledgement of new
information (Heritage, 1984). Although May is displaying some interactional competence
she is evidently struggling with this exchange due to the relevancies mobilised by the
introduction of ‘you rang’, which presents a challenge to her episodic memory
capabilities. Asking a person with little or no short-term memory to recount their recent
actions is a risky move. Here Natalie has designed her turn using an ordinary interactional
resource to presuppose episodic memory, which fails to take into account May’s cognitive
capabilities, thus generating diﬃculties in the communication.
Other questions
There are other question types that are designed to presuppose episodic memory (about the
kind of day May has had and what she has done) that May’s family often employ to distract
Jones 7
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her from the problems encountered at the start of the calls, which unexpectedly generate
further problems in the interaction. Again, before illustrating these with data from May’s
interactions, I demonstrate briefly how episodic memory is routinely and successfully
presupposed in the design of speakers’ questions during ‘ordinary’ interaction. In the
following Lesley asks her Mum if she has been to Church. The ability to respond
relevantly to this question relies on the recipient’s intact episodic memory. In extract 4,
this interactional task runs oﬀ smoothly.
Extract 4
Field: September-October 1988 (II): Side 2: Call 8
01 Les:.pt.h Have you been t’Chu":rch?
02 Mum: Yes. (0.2) [We’ve been i[n a few minutes but (.) I’ve]¼
03(Ski): ([[) ((whispered))]¼
04 [((clattering noises]¼
05 Mum: ¼[been watching Howard’s Wa:y,
Mum is able to recall her attendance at Church and produce the required response – a
confirmatory unmarked interjection – ‘Yes’ (line 02). Now compare this with May’s
responses to similar interactional task.
Extract 5
ALZ08
01 NAT:.hh That’s alright.¼"Did you go to
02 Church this morning, hh
03 (0.3)
04 MAY: I haven’t a clue darling.
Extract 6
ALZ37
01 NAT: Did you have a nice lunch ou:t.
02 (0.6)
03 ((Door knocks))
04 MAY: I’m sorry Natalie I can’t remember anything
05 these da:ys.
It is evident that May is unable to recollect her attendance at Church that morning and
whether she had a nice lunch out. Her episodic memory deficit prohibits her from engaging
competently in these interactions. She is unable to produce the simple confirmatory
interjections that are made relevant by the questions (as was seen in the previous extract).
Instead her avowal of forgetting is open and extreme (not being able to remember
‘‘anything’’ and not having a ‘‘clue’’; Pomerantz, 1986). Again her co-participant is
presupposing episodic memory in the design of the questions but May is unable to recall
the particular memories on which to base her responses. The misalignment here is not
generated because of May’s cognitive deficits alone. Instead the misalignment is
interactionally generated by questions that are in some way ‘ill fitted’ to May’s cognitive
competences. In May’s case, her episodic memory deficits have become so grave that
questions designed to place her in a position of primacy and therefore make her
responsible for recounting information (about whether she went to Church or had a nice
lunch) have the unintended consequence of exposing her lack of knowledge. Such questions
8 Dementia 0(0)
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introduce a whole new set of challenges for May, which cause both interactional and social
friction between her and her family members.
Again, despite these troubles that are collaboratively generated in the interaction, May is
often able to display herself to be a competent conversationalist by initiating sophisticated
interactional tasks to establish the ‘correct’ response to the questions (based not from her
memory per se but from information she obtains in the interaction).
Extract 7
ALZ01
01 NAT: Mother don’t worry about it.>Tell me did you
02 go to church this morning,
03 (3.2)
04 MAY: I think I did. Ye:s.
05 (0.6)
06 MAY: It is Sunda:y.
07 NAT: It’s Sunda:y. Yes.
08 (0.3)
09 NAT: I think maybe the Brears came to get
10 you.¼[Did they,]
11 MAY: [They di]d Natalie. You’re quite
12 right. I’m sorry.
Natalie’s question, ‘‘Did you go to Church this morning’’ is not only designed to
presuppose May’s episodic memory capabilities but that she is able to remember and tell
Natalie what she wants to know. This question generates diﬃculty for May, as the long delay
in answering and the uncertain response itself ‘‘I think I did. Yes’’ (line 04) are indicative of
May’s inability to recall her attendance at Church. However, May competently demonstrates
her awareness that ‘Yes’ is the interactionally appropriate response. She also displays
competence in managing the diﬃculties posed by the question by eliciting further
information from which she can base a more certain response. By asking ‘‘Is it Sunday’’
May proficiently retrieves ‘Sunday’ from the mention of ‘church’ and ‘this morning’ and
attempts to establish whether this is a valid question (i.e. that Natalie is not trying to catch
her out), whether it would be a likely practice for her, and thus enable her to confirm that she
attended. After information from Natalie about May’s morning, May confirms that the
information is correct but does not directly answer the initial question. Although her turn
begins with a strong claim to remember the Brears ‘getting her’, May is not making a claim
to having the knowledge of her attendance at Church. Despite some of May’s interactional
accomplishments during this sequence, she is unable to evoke the memory of the event,
which she needs in order to engage successfully with the question asked by the other.
Misalignment is generated by a question that is designed for someone whose episodic
memory is functional.
It is diﬃcult to make the claim that May ‘answers without knowing’. That being, it
is diﬃcult to say that May does not remember the events taking place but is able to rely
on her interactional skills to ‘come up’ with the correct response. Making claims about
May’s actual memory is dubious. However, these claims become more acceptable when
May’s answers backfire – when May’s answers (that claim memory) turn out to be
incorrect. In the extract below, like all the others, Natalie’s initial question is designed to
presuppose May’s episodic memory of the type of day she has had. May’s claim to remember
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doing ‘nothing special’ backfires when it turns out she has had a ‘special’ day (Laura and
Jack, May’s other daughter and son-in-law have visited) – she shows she is ‘answering
without knowing’.
Extract 8
ALZ61
01 NAT: Have you had a nice da:y,
02 (0.2)
03 MAY: I think so dear.¼ Well (.) the usual sort
04 of da:y. Nothing special.
05 NAT: Well I thought Laura and Jack came toda:y,
06 (0.8)
07 MAY: Sorry?
08 NAT: I thought you’d been out with Laura and
09 Jack toda:y,
10 (1.0)
11 MAY: Oh blimey. What day is it today.
12 NAT:.hhh Well today is Good Friday but I
13 think you di:d.
14 MAY: Sorry?
15 NAT:.h Today is Good Friday.
16 (2.4)
17 MAY: Ri:ght. Well if I- if you say I have
18 I have darling and thoroughly enjoyed
19 it.
20 NAT:.hh Good. That’s alright then.
‘Answering without knowing’ is a tactic or technique May has developed and employs to
display herself as being a competent interactant (this may be akin to the techniques that
people with other conditions such as Tourette’s or Aspergers develop to ‘pass for normal’
Wilensky, 2000). Indeed by doing this May is demonstrating her communicative competence
in the absence of cognitive capability. However, when she gets it wrong it exposes her
cognitive impairments that she is working hard to disguise. These diﬃcult interactional
moments arise due to the contingencies that are generated by the other’s contributions in
the interaction – due to the turns-at-talk they take which are designed without the recipient’s
capabilities and impairments in mind.
Responding to May’s questions
The diﬃculties that arise in these interactions are not only generated by the other’s
questions, but their responses to May’s questions. During these conversations
misalignment appears between the knowledge May has about her own life, and the
knowledge her family have about May’s life. This misalignment causes interactional as
well as social friction. The telephone conversations are overwhelmingly driven by May’s
desire to return home. One consequence of her Alzheimer’s is that, despite having lived in the
residential facility for some eight months before recording began, May discovers on a daily
basis, always with shock, as if for the first time, that she is no longer living in her own home.
People with Alzheimer’s often do not recognise their current environment as ‘home’ and
therefore repeatedly ask to return ‘home’ to a place there they felt comfortable and safe.
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May repeatedly calls her family to make a request to return home, which is subsequently and
repeatedly denied, causing anxiety and distress.
Extract 9
ALZ59
01 MAY: I’m coming home tomorrow aren’t I:,
02 (0.8)
03 BIL: ER:: No::,
04 (0.4)
05 MAY: Oh Bi:ll.
06 (1.2)
07 MAY: I thought I was- (0.4) only here for a
08 short time:.
Extract 10
ALZ49
01 MAY: When am I coming home.
02 (0.4)
03 NAT: Well you’re not coming home ‘cause that’s where
04 you live no:w.
05 MAY: Bloody Hell. I cannot accept tha:t. I really can’t.
Extract 11
ALZ10
01 MAY: When am I coming home.
02 NAT:.hh(.) Wul you’re not coming home any time soon
03 Mother ‘cause that’s that’s where you’re living
04 just now.
05 MAY: Oh bloody hell. I keep forgetting tha:t I know.
May designs her questioning turns (9:01, 10:01 and 11:01) to embody a clear assumption –
that she is returning home, the only issue being when. This makes declining these requests
somewhat harder for her family as May is displaying a specific orientation to the
unproblematic nature of the request being granted. However, the requests are always
denied. Her family often bluntly informs her that the care home is now her home. Not
only do these responses decline to grant May’s request to return home, they also directly
contradict her assumption and expose her memory loss. The misalignment and consequent
trouble (the shock and distress May experiences) is generated collaboratively in the sequence
by the inapposite questions posed by May (asked because to her lack of memory about her
living arrangements) as well as the contradictory response given by her family (which do not
support May’s knowledge of her life).
May also designs her questioning turns using modal verbs – ‘‘can I’’ which reflects her
entitlement to make the request and the unproblematic contingencies associated with her
family granting it (see Curl & Drew, 2008 for an explanation of such requests). Despite this
construction, her family nevertheless continues to contradict this sense of entitlement and
decline her return home.
Extract 12
ALZ20
01 MAY: Well when can I come ho:me.
02 BIL: Oh nhuh huh.hhh I don’t kno::w you- well-
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03 (0.6)
04 MAY: I’m sorry am I a great problem Bill.
05 (.)
06 BIL:.hh er:m (.) well not a great problem
07 no::..h but you do know that you’re living
08 there now don’t ya.
May still appears interactionally quite perceptive, in recognising Bill’s evasive and indirect
response (line 02) as indicative of her being a ‘problem’ in some way. However, her cognitive
impairment, which aﬀects her ability to remember important information about her life, like
where she is living, poses diﬃculties in interaction for her family. The significance of all these
requests is that, for May, they are the first time she is asking to return home (as she has
forgotten any previous request). The problems occurred when May’s recipients do not match
their responses to fit the assumptions embodied in the requests, often quite
uncompromisingly declining them, for the hundredth time. There is misalignment between
‘first time’ request and ‘nth time’ response. The responses also do not reflect May’s ‘reality’
(that she will return home soon), which causes problems.
There are two distinct approaches to caring for people with dementia – to collaborate
with their ‘reality’ (telling May, for instance, that she will return home soon) or to contradict
that ‘reality’ if it does not fit with the events of the ‘here and now’ (telling May that she is not
returning home because she resides in the care facility). The morality, legality and ethicality
of ‘deception’ in dementia care are widely debated topics (Day, James, Meyer, & Lee, 2011;
Elvish, James, & Milne, 2010; Hasselkus, 1997; James, 2008; Marzanski, 2000; Schermer,
2007; Tuckett, 2011; Wood-Mitchell, Waterworth, Stephenson, & James, 2006). Although I
will not explore these arguments here it is important to note that in May’s case, the ‘truth’
exposes her episodic memory impairments as it contradicts her knowledge about her life and
causes her great shock and distress.
Discussion
It is clear that Alzheimer’s disease irrevocably challenges a person’s capacity to communicate
with others. The previous research literature has tended to focus on the language disorders
associated with the condition, which are taken to have a cognitive basis. This diminishing
capacity to communicate however is not solely situated in the limitations of a person’s
cognitive and semantic impairments that have been the focus of previous research testing.
The real communicative diﬃculties people with Alzheimer’s experience are interactional –
they may arise, in part, from their cognitive deficits (especially their failing episodic memory)
but challenges are occasioned by, or are contingent on, the other’s contributions in
interaction. Such contributions we take for granted in our everyday interactions –
presupposing that the recipient to a question will be able to answer it. These questions are
omnirelevant and the presuppositions embedded in the design of them always rely on a
recipient’s memory. Communication challenges are thrown up in interactions between
May and her family when questions designed to presuppose memory are unsuccessful
(and May is unable to recall the answer), and indeed when May’s presuppositions about
her life are exposed as being incorrect by her family’s contradictory responses to her
questions. It is important to note that the family’s contribution in these interactions is not
designed deliberately to expose May’s deficit. Family members often have a diﬃcult task to
maintain positive communication and often questions asked in these interactions were an
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attempt to overcome some of the other diﬃculties experienced during the start of the calls. It
is useful to realise when practices in interaction have the unintended consequence of
generating troubles so that we can work to overcome these problems in subsequent
communication.
What I have shown is a brief overview of a small number of these interactional
co-constructed communicative problems. They are part of a wider investigation of the
diﬃculties people with Alzheimer’s experience in interacting with others. This paper
has marked a departure from the traditional focus on language level analysis and the
assumption that communicative deficits are intrinsic to the individual with Alzheimer’s,
and instead focuses on the collaborative communicative challenges that arise in the
interaction itself.
What is especially interesting about these complex and problematic interactional
moments is a person with Alzheimer’s ability to develop strategies for coping in
interaction, for displaying interactional competence despite their cognitive deficits.
Although these strategies are not always successful, May has nevertheless developed a
technique of ‘answer without knowing’ as a tactic for ‘passing for normal’ to disguise her
cognitive troubles. In doing so she is demonstrating her communicative competence in the
absence of cognitive capability.
The significance of understanding communication as collaborative, and problems in
interaction as co-constructed, is that family members can play an active part in
co-managing interactions with their relatives who have Alzheimer’s in the hope that
conversations will be more rewarding for those involved, and that important relationships
can be maintained for longer.
Limitations: A consideration of a single case
Analysis was based on only a single person – although the findings resonate with research
involving other people with Alzheimer’s in a range of environments, which points to the
likely conceptual transferability of findings, there are limitations regarding representation
and generalisability.
This research is not necessarily representative of people with Alzheimer’s and their
experiences in general. There is great variability in the communicative impairments
experienced by people with Alzheimer’s, compounded by the heterogeneous nature of the
disease more generally; assessing only one person does not represent this variation. One
person may present with particular and unique symptoms, may have a distinctive
communication style or may be influenced by their specific social and cultural
circumstances. These variables, as well as the type of dementia a person has, may
significantly alter their interactions and the subsequent analyses of them. Although certain
symptoms and behaviours can appear in people with Alzheimer’s at the same stage, it is
important to acknowledge the caveat that the findings may not apply to everyone with the
disease, thereby limiting the generalisability of the results reported here. Nevertheless there
has been an increasing acceptance of the use of single case studies in dementia research
(Freeman, 2008; Hamilton, 1994, 2008; Muller & Guendouzi, 2002, 2005; Muller &
Wilson, 2008; Ramanathan, 1994). A number of these researchers pointed out the
complexities inherent in the group studies of people with Alzheimer’s due to the
variability in the nature of their communicative impairments (Bayles, 1985; Gardner,
1974) and the heterogeneous nature of the disease more generally (Ritchie & Touchon,
Jones 13
XML Template (2013) [16.8.2013–3:42pm] [1–19]
//blrnas3/cenpro/ApplicationFiles/Journals/SAGE/3B2/DEMJ/Vol00000/130140/APPFile/SG-DEMJ130140.3d (DEM) [PREPRIN-
TER stage]
1992; Schellenberg, 1995). They advocated adopting an in-depth individualistic approach to
the examination of language. Therefore, the methodological emphasis and strength resides in
its ‘rigorous analysis of small numbers of sequences’ (Wootton, 1997: p.ix), with the
available recordings creating a special opportunity for the extensive exploration of
interaction. Whilst the specific findings regarding May and her family’s communication
may not apply directly to other interactions between other conversational partners,
nevertheless ‘‘an in-depth examination of language used by particular people in particular
interactions will provide us with a heightened understanding of interactional influence on
language as it relates to Alzheimer’s disease’’ (Hamilton, 1994: p.31).
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Notes
1. This is worthy of closer analytic attention and will be the subject of a future paper.
2. This is an ongoing trouble for many people who have Alzheimer’s who reside in care as homes
routinely provide their residents with pay phones. Also family members often prefer this mode of
communication as opposed to using mobile phones. When discussing these issues with Natalie I
suggested that the problems May experiences with the payphone causes great interactional
difficulties at the beginnings of all the calls. I suggested providing May with a mobile phone with
restricted credit. Her family thought this would be an unwise solution as May would call at all hour
of the day and night. The staff at the home can at least regulate the payphone during the night
whereas mobile use would not be regulated.
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Appendix 1
Transcription convention
[overlap] Brackets: Onset and offset of overlapping talk.
" Equals sign: Utterances are latched or ran together, with no gap of silence.
- Hyphen: Preceding sound is cut off/self-interrupted.
"word# Up/Down arrows: indicate pitch Fuctuations up or down.
(0.0) Time pause: Silence measured in seconds and tenths of seconds.
(.) Parentheses with a period: A micropause of less than 0:2 s:
: Colon(s): Preceding sound is extended or stretched; the more the longer.
. Period: Falling or terminal intonation.
,Comma: Continuing or slightly rising intonation.
? Question mark: Rising intonation.
underline Underlining: Increased volume relative to surrounding talk.
soft Degree signs: Talk with decreased volume relative to surrounding talk.
>fast< Greater-than/less-than signs: Talk with increased pace relative to surrounding
talk.
<slow> Less-than/greater-than signs: Talk with decreased pace relative to surrounding
talk.
.h Superscripted periods preceding h’s: Inbreaths; the more the longer.
h H’s: Outbreaths (sometimes indicating laughter); the more the longer.
hah/heh Laugh token: Relative open or closed position of laughter.
(that)/(hat) Filled single parentheses: Transcriptionist doubt about talk. Alternative
hearings.
((Cough)) Filled double parentheses: Additional details, or an event/sound not easily
transcribed.
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